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There have been increasing calls for studying politicians’ use of accounting information, especially 
adopting a qualitative and contextual perspective. This paper aims at responding to such calls by 
exploring accounting information use by politicians in the municipal setting, looking at three typical 
decisions with different levels of political conflict and distinguishing between the policy-formulation 
and decision-making stages. The results show that, during policy-formulation, information is used 
mostly as an answer and learning machine. At the decision-making stage, the level of conflict will 
influence not only the quantity of information used, but also how it is used. Under low political 
conflict, a reassuring use appears to predominate, whereas under increasingly conflicting situations, 
the use will shift towards a dialogical form, whereby accounting information becomes the rational 




The use of accounting information has increasingly become a central issue in public sector literature 
(Ter Bogt, 2003b; Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2008) and practice, especially since 
managerialization movements have given prominence to performance measurement systems, but also 
highlighted their possible shortcomings (e.g. Lapsley, 1999; Arnaboldi et al., 2015). Interestingly, 
scholars have focused their attention mainly on the managerial uses of accounting information 
(Liguori et al., 2012; Kroll, 2014) and, consistently, most attention has been devoted to understand the 
“purposeful” use of accounting information, i.e. instrumental in supporting better decisions (for 
example, Moynihan and Pandey, 2010), leaving in the background other uses, including “political” 
(Moynihan et al., 2012), “legitimizing” (Ansari and Euske, 1987) or “ammunition machine” (Burchell 
et al., 1980), which may be particularly relevant in the political realm. However, whether, how and 
under which circumstances politicians actually use accounting information has remained significantly 
under-researched (Pollitt 2006; Van Helden, 2015).  
Recent calls have thus emerged for looking at the actual use of accounting information by politicians, 
especially adopting a qualitative perspective (Van Helden, 2015), and with a stronger attention to 
contextualizing accounting information use (Askim, 2007; Demaj and Summermatter, 2012).  
This paper aims at contributing to fill these gaps by exploring accounting information use by 
politicians in the municipal setting. In doing so, different uses of information are highlighted, 
distinguishing reassuring, ammunition (legitimizing and de-legitimizing), answer and learning uses; 
which uses are shown to be dependent on the decision situation, in terms of degree of political conflict 
and stage of the policy cycle.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical background; the third 
section clarifies the research objectives and methods; section 4 presents the results of the empirical 




Politicians’ uses of accounting information 
So far few studies have investigated politicians’ perspectives on accounting information. Most of 
these studies have investigated the use of accounting information reported in formal documents and 
have found that it does not appear to significantly attract politicians’ attention, though non-financial 
performance information seems to be preferred to financial (Ezzamel et al., 2007; Ter Bogt, 2004; 
Liguori et al., 2012). Moreover, extant empirical analyses have looked more at politicians’ 
perceptions on information importance rather than its actual uses (e.g. Liguori et al. 2012; Van 
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Helden, 2015), often abstracting the use from the specific context where information is considered 
(Van Helden, 2015). An attempt to contextualize the concept of use is Askim’s (2007) study of 
Norwegian councillors, which shows that performance information use is higher in some policy areas. 
This study seems to suggest that there may be value in contextualizing politicians’ decisions to better 
understand their use of accounting information. The section below specifically addresses this issue. 
 
Contextualizing political decisions 
There is an established body of contingent research, which emphasizes the role of contexts in 
influencing accounting systems. For example, Thompson and Tuden (1959), suggest that the degree 
of reliance on calculation, expert advice, compromise or inspiration will depend on two criteria, i.e., 
the disagreement over organizational objectives, and the uncertainty over cause-effects patterns. 
Burchell et al. (1980) identify four different roles for accounting, depending on the degree of 
uncertainty on goals and cause-effect relationships: answer, learning, ammunition (i.e., used to 
promote particular positions and interests), and rationalization (i.e., used to justify actions) machines.  
Among public sector studies, the literature has recognized that the use of accounting information is 
multifaceted (Behn, 2003; Van Dooren et al., 2010). However, most empirical studies on performance 
information use have adopted a one-dimensional view of use as “purposeful”, i.e., as aimed at 
supporting and improving decision-making (e.g., Moynihan and Pandey, 2010), with other uses, 
including “political” and “perverse” ones, being acknowledged, but left virtually unexplored 
(Moynihan et al., 2012). Since public sector organizations deal with divergent interests and 
ambiguous goals, actors may be expected to use performance information for alternative purposes 
rather than improving decisions, for example to convince their counterparts within and outside the 
organization that proposed actions and decisions are reasonable, acceptable and legitimate, or to 
exercise power or to reassure that routines and the status quo are preserved (Feldman and March, 
1981; Hofstede, 1981; Ansari and Euske, 1987).  
Only few studies, however, have specifically focused on how the context affects the type of 
information used and the intensity and diversity of use. According to Hofstede (1981), as ambiguity of 
goals increases, and measurability, clarity about cause-effect relations, and repetitiveness of activities 
decrease, organizations will have to move from cybernetic types of controls (routine, expert and trial-
and-error) to judgemental, intuitive and political types of controls. Along the same lines, 
Noordergraaf and Abma (2003) propose to distinguish the use of performance measurement looking 
at two dimensions, namely the extent to which issues are known (for example on means-end relations) 
and the extent to which they are contested.  
The above literature is either focused on managers, or does not distinguish between the circumstances 
of information use by politicians and managers. However, it may very well be that degree of 
ambiguity/uncertainty of/disagreement on goals may be relevant especially in the politicians’ realm, 
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as they refer to the political and strategic decisions on the needs to be addressed, policies to be 
adopted and service to be provided. Conversely, measurability of outputs, degree of uncertainty of 
cause-effect relationships, clarity and repetitiveness of tasks may bear more relevance in the 
managerial realm, as they pertain to the means to be deployed to implement policies and decisions. 
This suggests that a starting point for contextualizing political decision-making may be to look at the 
degree of ambiguity of/disagreement on goals, i.e. the level of conflict over decisions. Moreover, as 
suggested in previous research, the extent and the type of use of performance information might be 
contingent upon the course of the policy decision-making process (Ter Bogt, 2004; Askim, 2007; Ter 
Bogt et al., 2015), whereby different stages might be identified (Lasswell, 1956), including agenda-
setting, policy-formulation (identification of alternatives for action), decision-making (the formal 
decision to take on the policy), implementation and evaluation.  
 
Methods  
This paper aims at exploring accounting information use by politicians by looking at how such use 
may diverge under different circumstances.  
Given this aim, and in response to Van Helden’s (2015) call to develop more qualitative analyses, a 
case study approach was adopted (Eisenhardt, 1989). Typical decisions to be taken during the 
budgetary process in the same municipality were identified and analysed, so as to ensure invariance of 
other conditions. To do so, an Italian municipality of 13,500 inhabitants was selected, which will be 
called Marbletown for reasons of anonymity.  
The literature reviewed above suggests that contextualizing political decisions may require to take 
into account on the one hand the different policy stages at which they take place, and on the other the 
degree of political conflict over goals. Thus, in the analysis two policy stages were identified, i.e. 
policy-formulation and decision-making. In Italian municipalities “policy-formulation” will take place 
when the aldermen of the municipal executive board (i.e., the political body with executive role, 
whose composition is generally an expression of the political majority) draft, discuss among 
themselves and approve the budget proposals to be submitted to the council. The “decision-making” 
stage will take place when the council (i.e., the political body with deliberating role, whose 
composition will include both majority and minority councillors) discusses and approves the budget.  
For each of the two policy stages, three decisions were identified, with respectively low (services for 
people with disabilities), moderate (waste collection) and high (bike path) level of political conflict. 
The level of political conflict was assessed looking at the level of disagreement of council members 
on the goals to be achieved and considering the intensity, length and controversy in the discussions 
related to each issue. 
To ensure better comparability across decisions, each decision refers to expenditures that absorb a 
significant amount (ranging from €390,000 to €1,117,000) of the total expenditures (about 
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€14,000,000 per year) and that were adopted during the budgeting processes in the years 2014 (bike 
path) and 2015 (people with disabilities and waste collection service). 
The sources for analysing the case were budgetary documents, newspaper articles, council’s minutes 
and interviews with aldermen and councillors. For each decision, the relevant alderman was 
interviewed for about an hour in order to reconstruct the decision-making process and the role of 
accounting information in it. The minutes of the municipal council and the municipal documents were 
downloaded from the website of the town; the articles were retrieved from the Internet or as hard 
copies from local newspapers. The interviews were carried out in September 2015 (aldermen) and 
January 2016 (councillors).  
The study relies on an ethnographic approach, in that one of the authors was actively involved in the 
activities of the executive board. Auto-ethnographic approaches present important strengths (Karra 
and Philipps, 2008) in terms of ease of access, reduced resource requirements and reduced problems 
with translation. The risk of high involvement of the investigator that could determine a biased 
interpretation of findings is the first disadvantage of this approach, though this risk is implicit in any 
type of research, even when the researcher is not directly involved. These risks have been balanced by 
the strong reliance on triangulation of sources, as well as by the presence of the other authors, who do 
not have any involvement in the activities of the municipality. The data were analysed through a 
narrative construction, i.e. writing the stories of the decisions, and a collective interpretation, based on 
the interaction between the three authors. 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the three types of decisions analysed, distinguishing them according to the levels of 
political conflict and the policy stage, and presents the politicians’ uses of accounting information for 
each of them. In the next subsections the processes of use of accounting information are described for 
each type of decision. 
 
Table 1 – Politician’s uses of accounting information in three settings with different levels of 
political conflict and across two policy stages 
 Services for people with 
disabilities: 
low conflict 
Waste collection:  
moderate conflict  
Bike path: 





Reassuring use of information 
Answer and learning 
machine (Burchell et al. 
1980) 
Answer and learning 




Reassuring use of information 
Ammunition machine 
(Burchell et al., 1980): use 
of accounting that provides 
economic rational 





(Burchell et al., 1980): use 
of accounting that provides 
economic rational 
arguments intertwined with 
emotional and ethical 
appeals, with involvement 
of external stakeholders 
 
A decision under low conflict: the services for people with disabilities  
In Marbletown, people with disabilities receive either assistance at school or day-care through the 
Centre for People with Disabilities created in 1990. On average, €390,000 are spent per year for these 
services; an amount that has virtually remained unchanged over time despite the decline in 
government transfers. 
In the policy-formulation stage of the budgeting process for 2015, first the Social Services Alderman 
worked with the Social Service manager to prepare the budget proposal. The proposal was developed 
relying on historical expenditure trends for the last ten years as well as information on the perceived 
quality of the service measured through user satisfaction survey. Secondly, the proposal was discussed 
by the municipal executive board. Here, the proposal provided the basis for the Social Services 
Alderman to reassure the other members of the board that no need emerged for increasing spending 
for the year to come, and that the quality of the services was satisfactory. As the Budget Alderman 
highlighted during the board meeting: “We must cut spending in all areas but never cut the spending 
on assistance to people with disabilities. It is one of the fundamental choices of our political 
commitment and the data show that there is no increase in expenditure”. Thus, at the policy-
formulation stage, routinely prepared financial information, jointly with a reference to an 
“incontestable” ethical principle, were sufficient to ensure a smooth approval of the proposal.  
In the decision-making stage, as shown by the minutes of councillor’s meetings, the Budget Alderman 
highlighted that “This year we confirm the considerable budget allocation for support for disabled 
people: €390.000”, and this proposal was approved without opening any ad hoc discussion. No 
changes were required both to the amount of expenditure and to the service arrangements. This 
confirms the absence of political conflict over the issue, irrespective of political orientation.  
Interestingly, in this case the use of financial and non-financial information is minimal, reduced to the 
amount of data necessary to reassure and be reassured that “business is as usual”. This choice seems 
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to be institutionalized in the whole council, supported by an explicit ethos appeal during the 
formulation stage and by an implicit ethos appeal during the council meeting. This is confirmed by the 
words of an opposition councillor: “We did not ask for accounting information about services for 
disabled people because we support it ourselves. It is one of the few right things done by the 
municipality”.  
 
A decision under moderate conflict: waste collection 
The decision on the management of waste collection services was characterized by a moderate level 
of political conflict in that agreement on the expected overall outcome (i.e., the increase of the 
recycling waste rates and a reduction in the tariff) was accompanied by disagreement on fees, in terms 
of amount and arrangements for collection. Waste collection services cost around €1.117 million in 
2015 and €1.31 million in 2014.  
At the beginning of the budgetary process for 2015, the Alderman for Environmental Services 
prepared a proposal (formulation stage) containing data on the costs and results for 2014 (e.g., 
percentage of recycled waste; savings stemming from recycling, etc.) and the available alternatives 
and related costs for the provision of services in 2015, including the different choices over the 
collection of waste fees. She presented alternative solutions for fee collection, proposing to keep 
entrusting it to the current in-house company (where the municipality is the main shareholder) on the 
grounds that it was not more expensive and guaranteed better services and transparency on the data 
collected. The option of outsourcing the service had the same costs (€70,000) with the disadvantage of 
an indirect instead of a direct control. The municipal board carefully examined the proposal and after 
four meetings approved those alternatives that seemed not uneconomical and apt to guarantee high 
quality services. The only revision made to the initial proposal by the municipal executive board was 
the reduction of the fee (from €5 to €3) that the Alderman for Environmental Services proposed for 
yard waste collection. The possible choices moved in a range from a lack of service coverage (€0) to 
the total coverage of the yard waste collection (€12). In this respect, the Alderman for Environmental 
Services during the interview said: “I have really appreciated the way the executive board has 
analysed my proposal. By comparing the costs of each available alternative, we have identified the 
services that need to be improved and those that can be scaled-down”. In the decision-making stage, 
the Alderman illustrated the proposal, sparking a lively debate between the majority and the minority 
(as suggested by the length of the discussion, documented by the minute, whereby 4,267 words were 
devoted to debate this issue, as opposed to an average of 1,307 words for all the other issues handled 
in the same council meeting). Two opposition councillors challenged the decisions to introduce a € 3 
fee for yard waste collection and to shrink the number of weekly services. Their arguments were 
based on an ideological line of reasoning, grounded on ethical considerations: “You impose a tax on 
the gardens, is it a crime to have a garden?” (minority councillor, minutes of the council meeting), 
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where accounting information did not play a significant role. Minority councillors questioned also the 
proposal to outsource the collection of fees without a proper bid, and this time the ethical 
considerations were supplemented by reliance on the use of cost data, seemingly to add an economic 
rational nuance to the arguments. For example, a minority councillor (from the minutes of the 
meeting) pointed out “[…]is it possible that the service provided by [name of the in-house company 
proposed for collecting rates] costs €90,000 of ordinary performance and others €15,000 as 
depreciation […]? We are spending more than €120,000 for this service”. Another opposition 
councillor stated: “I would like to know: before entering another monopoly [from the previous service 
arrangement to the in house collection of rates] did we do any economic analysis in order to 
understand if this service is convenient?”. Both financial and non-financial information were used by 
the Alderman for Environmental Services to promote her own proposal during the council by showing 
the results of the actions undertaken, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness: “As for the 2015 budget, 
the cost of waste services will be €1,117,576 compared to a cost of €1,310,585 for 2014. […] as a 
result of the choices we made that have produced an increase of recycling waste - from 73% in 2013 
to 76.9% in 2014”. The choice to sell the differentiated portion of waste as raw materials has resulted 
in a higher level of recycling and lower tariffs. However, the municipal executive board’s proposal 
was approved without modifications. All the councillors of the majority and one of the minority 
expressed a favourable vote.  
 
A decision under high conflict: the bike path 
The 2-kilometer and €1-million-worth bike path was a decision that absorbed significant time and 
efforts during the budgeting process in Marbletown, as low agreement existed about whether and how 
to build it. The majority had committed to sustainable transports, as made evident in their electoral 
program: “"Sweet" mobility will be favoured, giving priority to the extension, the safety and the 
connection of the network of cycle paths by developing a real plan of cycling”. The opposition 
prioritized other means of transport (e.g. cars), claiming that citizens in their daily life use them more 
extensively. At the formulation stage, the Public Works Alderman defined with his staff a proposal 
based on both financial (e.g. cost per meter of the construction of the bike path) and non-financial 
(average number of cyclists riding in the main streets) information. This reflects what was declared by 
the Alderman for Public Works in the municipal news bulletin: “The first thing to do is to start from 
real data: in June 2013 we built the first census of cycling […]”. The executive board embraced this 
proposal as the potential usefulness of the bike path was proven by the number of active cyclists and 
pedestrians, whereas financial sustainability was assessed comparing the expected costs per meter of 
path with the costs reported for similar initiatives in other municipalities.  
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In the decision-making stage, the divergent point of views of the majority and the minority triggered a 
lively debate, which even reached out to the citizens, as the two political sides tried to build external 
consensus around their opposite visions. Within the council, the minority councillors defined the bike 
path as a “non-priority” and questioned the available alternatives for financing the work (e.g. the taxes 
collected by allowing the construction of a shopping centre). The choice has been debated especially 
outside the city council, while instead inside it had little importance: from the minutes emerge only 
1,513 words dedicated to the bike path. Outside the council, the debate inflamed. “The cost of the 
renovation of the street is crazy, over €1,000,000; resources that should be spent to satisfy other 
needs in the town and to create jobs for the unemployed of Marbletown” said one minority councillor 
in a public meeting. Anonymous leaflets were posted on the pines paralleling the street where the bike 
path was being proposed, reading: “For a work of little value you are killing fifty plants that are part 
of the history of Marbletown. We will chain ourselves to the pines”. Thus, the minority used a 
combination of cost-related, i.e., economic rational considerations, emotional levers and ethical 
arguments to appeal to the different sensitivities of citizens. “Starting from the assumption that we 
opposed the whole project, we focused on those data that attract the attention of citizens most, i.e., the 
total cost" (opposition councilor, interview). On the municipal bulletin, the Public Works Alderman 
highlighted that the pines would be replaced by hornbeams, described as more suited to the climate of 
Marbletown, and explained that the damage created by the roots of pine trees required over €15,000 
per year in street maintenance. The Mayor and the Alderman also recalled, in two public meetings 
(April, 2014) and in a public political debate (May 8th, 2014), that the bike path serves the weakest 
people, such as children and the elderly, while the municipal bulletin informed people that the bike 
path would also imply the renovation of the street lighting, with savings of over 70% on electricity 
consumption. In the end, the Alderman's proposal was approved without modification thanks to the 
votes in favour of the entire majority. All the opposition councillors voted against. 
 
Discussion 
This study is one among the first attempts at contextualizing politicians’ use of accounting 
information. The findings appear to confirm that the type of use will be affected by the specific 
contingencies when it takes place, and more specifically by the policy stage and the level of conflict 
over decisions. 
When the political conflict over decisions is low, as in the typical case where an expenditure item in 
the budget must be routinely confirmed, the use of accounting information by politicians tends to be 
predominantly reassuring, aimed at confirming that a certain service and the related expenditures do 
not need discarding or revision, but simply can be kept “as usual”. This type of decision is probably 
the most typical one in the local government realm, where, once a number of services are agreed and 
decided upon, both in their political desirability and operational features, they end up becoming taken 
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for granted routines (Hofstede, 1981). Thus, the use of financial and non-financial information is 
minimal, reduced to the production of those data that are necessary to reassure political bodies that 
there are no exceptions to the normal course of things. Interestingly, in this case the distinction 
between the formulation and the decision-making stages of the policy cycle appears to bear less 
relevance, as in both stages, the routine nature of the decision appears to require a similar approach to 
the use of information.   
When the political conflict over decisions becomes moderate, the quantity and diversity of 
information used appear to increase, while the types of uses tend to be different at the formulation and 
decision-making stages. The analysis shows that both financial and non-financial information were 
intensely used to reach the final decision, with two different purposes. On the one hand, accounting 
information was used in the formulation stage as an answer and learning machine (Burchell et al., 
1980), providing the basis for evaluating the different available options in the light of agreement on 
goals within the executive board. On the other hand, this same information was the common platform 
used in the decision-making stage by the two political sides to support their own position and 
challenge the opposite one. Accounting information (such as costs, efficiency and effectiveness 
indicators), thus, represented an ammunition machine (Burchell et al., 1980) through which different 
political positions were justified or challenged. 
Finally, when the level of political conflict is high, the quantity and diversity of information becomes 
even more significant, and such information appears to be also used outside the institutional decision-
making settings to attract the public’s attention so as to increase the citizens’ pressure around the 
decision. However, again, in the formulation stage the information is rather used as an answer and 
learning machine, i.e., to allow comparison and evaluation of alternatives to achieve the goal shared 
by all the members of the executive board. Conversely, at the decision-making stage, accounting 
information played a central role in the majority-opposition dialogue, providing the grounds for 
legitimizing one’s position and de-legitimizing the opponents’ arguments. However, the debate was 
dragged outside the institutional places where the budgetary process took place and accounting 
information also appeared to be used by the two parties to appeal to positive or negative citizens’ 
emotions and ethical values, thus potentially and indirectly impacting on the level of political 
consensus. This suggests that accounting information represents one of the “ammunitions” available 
to politicians, i.e., the “economic/rational” pillar of a wider discourse, where also ethical and 
emotional arguments will be used to (de) legitimize decisions.  
 
Conclusions and implications 
This paper responds to the calls for studying politicians’ use of accounting information by providing a 
twofold contribution. First, it shows that, in contextualizing politicians’ use of accounting 
information, a fruitful approach may be to refer to the level of political conflict over decisions and to 
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the stage of the policy cycle. Second, it suggests that the increase in the level of conflict will affect the 
quantity of information used, but also the types of uses. More specifically, under low political 
conflict, a reassuring use appears to predominate both the formulation and the decision-making stages. 
Under increasingly conflicting situations, the policy-formulation stage will witness a predominant use 
of accounting as answer and learning machine, whereas the decision-making stage will feature 
accounting as an ammunition machine, used to support or counter positions in the political arena by 
grounding them on economic rational considerations. Interestingly, when the political conflict 
escalates, arguments based on accounting information will become increasingly intertwined with 
ethical and emotional rhetorical arguments. 
This suggests a few practical implications. At the decision-making stage, when decisions are of a 
routine nature, and are characterized by the absence of juxtaposition of interests, politicians, both 
aldermen and councillors, incentives to actively use information appear to be limited. This could 
happen to the detriment of the services provided, that may not be put under serious scrutiny, thus 
missing a chance of improvement. This shows that the provision of information is not sufficient per se 
to bring attention to quality, quantity or costs of services, but that incentives to such use, in terms of 
processes and procedures, or juxtaposition of interests, must be in place to avoid its reassuring use. At 
the same time, the latter may respond to the need to avoid excessive conflict, and to discuss again 
issues that were already settled in the past, reducing the complexities of decision-making (Wildavsky, 
1964). This suggests that, for those services where conflict is low, the right balance should be ensured 
between attracting the attention on key indicators, for example in comparative terms, while not asking 
politicians to re-discuss priorities at any budgeting cycle.   
When political conflict escalates, the members of the executive board appear to devote greater 
attention to accounting information, using it in the formulation of policies. However, when at the 
decision-making stage majority and opposition players enter the political game, accounting shifts its 
role from calculation machine to become a part of an arsenal of ammunitions to defend or attack a 
decision. In this respect, the reliability of data and the different privileges of access to data (from 
majority to opposition) may play a major role in affecting how power is distributed (Hardy, 1996) and 
how the decision-making process unfolds, and also in deciding “who wins”. For example, oppositions 
may bring the debate outside the official meetings, and leverage ethical or emotional arguments to 
reinstate a balance of power in the decision-making process, especially if accounting information is 
produced by and at the main benefit of the majority. The “impartiality” of information and “equal” 
access to internal information become crucial. This may increase the transparency of the process and 
also underpin a clearly “open” discussion in which the intent to attain short-term support for one’s 
position is abandoned at the benefit of a search for long-term service improvements. This may recall 
Habermas’ view of the “ideal speech” and communicative rationality, whereby the definition of ends 
to achieve should result from systematic ‘discourses’ between different positions (see Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2009). The downside of this model is that the decision-making process may be lengthened 
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and that it may remain an “ideal” if incentives to reduce opportunism are not put in place. At the same 
time, it seems likely that decisions taken by politicians are led not only by economic rationality but 
also by political rationality (Wildavsky, 1966; Ter Bogt, 2003b), and thus one of the future challenges 
for accounting scholars may be to look at the interactions of these two rationalities with ethical and 
emotional considerations (Green, 2004). 
The analysis highlights the need to “unpack” the politicians’ use of accounting information taking into 
consideration that politicians may play different roles and have different degrees of power in the 
various stages of the policy cycle. The results provide preliminary evidence that it may be fruitful to 
recognize the existence of a continuum of uses between the managerial/administrative sphere (where 
calculation and “purposeful” use may play a major role) at one hand, and the political (where 
reassuring and ammunition machine uses may predominate) at the other, with policy-formulation 
being at the boundaries between them.   
As any piece of research, also this paper presents limitations. The results are exploratory in nature and 
may reflect the specific country, type and size of government where the analysis was performed as 
well as the subjective interpretations of the authors. Also, the case study is a small Italian 
municipality, characterized by an electoral system with a strong majority premium that leads to 
unitary lists. In executive boards based on a coalition of parties, more compromises may be needed to 
reach an agreement1. However, these limitations as well as the findings appear to suggest a number of 
further fruitful research avenues. First, this study may be carried out in other contexts (including other 
countries, sizes and types of governments). Second, other types of decisions may be observed, 
adopting a finer grained view of conflicting situations or combining the selection criteria we used with 
additional ones (e.g., current vs capital expenditures, ethically charged issues, measurability of 
outcomes, dispersion or concentration of power among politicians and managers and within political 
bodies).  
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